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Abstract—Deception plays a key role in adversarial or
strategic interactions for the purpose of self-defence and
survival. This paper introduces a general framework and
solution to address deception. Most existing approaches for
deception consider obfuscating crucial information to rational
adversaries with abundant memory and computation resources.
In this paper, we consider deceiving adversaries with bounded
rationality and in terms of expected rewards. This problem
is commonly encountered in many applications especially in-
volving human adversaries. Leveraging the cognitive bias of
humans in reward evaluation under stochastic outcomes, we
introduce a framework to optimally assign resources of a limited
quantity to optimally defend against human adversaries. Mod-
eling such cognitive biases follows the so-called prospect theory
from behavioral psychology literature. Then we formulate the
resource allocation problem as a signomial program to minimize
the defender’s cost in an environment modeled as a Markov
decision process. We use police patrol hour assignment as an
illustrative example and provide detailed simulation results
based on real-world data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deception refers to a deliberate attempt to mislead or
confuse adversaries so that they may take strategies that
are in the defender’s favor [1]. Deception can limit the
effectiveness of an adversary’s attack, waste adversary’s
resources and prevent the leakage of critical information [2].
It is a widely observed behavior in nature for self-defence
and survival. Deception also plays a key role in many aspects
of human society, such as economics [3], warfare [4], game
[5], cyber security [2] and so on.
In this paper, we focus on the scenario in which the adver-
sary acts in an environment where this interaction is modeled
as a Markov decision process (MDP) [6]. The adversary’s
aim is to collect rewards at each state of the MDP and the
defender tries to minimize the accumulated reward through
deception. Many existing approaches for deception rely on a
rational adversary with sufficient memory and computation
power to find its optimal policy [7], [1]. However, deceiving
an adversary with only bounded rationality [8], i.e., one
whose decisions may follow certain rules that deviate from
the optimal action [9], has not been adequately studied so
far. Deceiving an adversary with bounded rationality finds,
for example, its application in intrusion detection and pro-
tection [10] or public safety [11]. Different from obfuscating
sensitive system information to the adversary [12], [13], by
deception, we mean that the defender optimally assigns a
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limited resource to each state, such that the expected cost
from defender’s perspective (or equivalently, the reward for
the adversary) incurred by an adversary can be minimized,
even though the adversary is expecting more based on his
cognitively biased view of rewards.
To deceive a human more effectively, it is essential to
understand the human’s cognitive characteristics and what
affects his decisions (particularly with stochastic outcomes).
Works in behavior psychology, e.g. [14], suggested that
humans’ decision-making follows intuition and bounded
rationality. Empirical evidence has shown that humans
tend to evaluate gains and losses differently in decision-
making [15]. Humans tend to over-estimate the likelihood
of low-probability events and underestimate the likelihood
of high-probability events in a nonlinear fashion [16], [15].
Risk-sensitive measures, such as those in the so-called
prospect theory [16], capture such biases and are widely
used in psychology and economics to characterize human
preferences. Furthermore, humans tend to make decisions
that are often sub-optimal [17]. It is generally believed that
such sub-optimality is the result of intuitive decisions or
preferences that happen automatically and quickly without
much reflection [17], [14]. Human decisions are subject to
stochasticity due to the limited computational capacity and
inherent noise [18]. Consequently, human decisions are often
cognitively biased (have a different reward mechanism),
probabilistic (have a stochastic action selection policy) and
memoryless (only depends on the current state). These are
the very characteristics of human decision-making we expect
to account for in reward-based deception.
This paper investigates how one can deceive a human ad-
versary by optimally allocating limited resources to minimize
his rewards. We model the environment as an MDP to capture
the choices available to a human decision-maker and their
probabilistic outcomes. We consider opportunistic human
adversaries, i.e., they usually do not have significant planning
and only act based on immediately available rewards [11].
We describe the human adversary’s policy to select different
actions following the prospect theory and bounded rationality
[8]. We model both the adversary’s perceived reward and
defender’s cost (equivalently, the adversary’s reward from
the defender’s point of view) as functions of the resources
available at each state of the MDP. Additionally, we define
a subset of the states in the MDP as sensitive states that the
human adversary should be kept from visiting.
We then formulate the optimal resource allocation problem
as a signomial program (SP) to minimize the defender’s
cost. SPs are a special form of nonlinear programming
problems, and they are generally nonconvex. Solving non-
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convex NLPs is NP-hard [19] in general, and a globally
optimal solution of an SP cannot be computed efficiently.
SPs generalize geometric programs (GP), which can be
transformed into convex optimization problems and then can
be solved efficiently [20]. In this paper, we approximate the
proposed SP to a GP. In numerical experiments, we show
that this approach obtain locally optimal solutions of the SP
efficiently by solving a number of GPs. We demonstrate the
approach with a problem on the assignment of police patrol
hour against opportunistic criminals [11].
The problem we study is closely related to the Stackelberg
security game (SSG) which consists of an attacker and a
defender that interact with each other. In SSG, the defender
acts first with limited resources and then the attackers play in
response [21]. SSG is a popular formalism to study security
problems against human adversaries. Early efforts focused
on one-shot games where an adversary can only take one
move [22] without considering human’s bounded rationality.
Then repeated SSG was considered in wildlife security [10]
and fisheries [23] where the defender and the adversary can
have repeated interaction. However, neither of these papers
considered how a human perceives probabilities, where the
existence of nonlinear probability weighting curves is a well-
known result in prospect theory [16]. Such phenomenon was
taken into account in [24] and [25]. But [24] only studied
one-shot games and [25] did not consider the adversaries
may move from place to place.
The rest of this paper is organized as the following.
We first provide the necessary preliminaries for stochastic
environment modeling, human cognitive biases and decision-
making in Section II. Then we formulate the human decep-
tion problem in terms of resource allocation in Section III
and show that it can be transformed into a signomial program
in Section IV. We propose the computational approach to
solve the signomial program in Section V. Section VI shows
simulations results and discusses their implications. We con-
clude our paper and discusses possible future directions in
Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Monomials, Posynomials, and Signomials.
Let V = {x1, . . . , xn} be a finite set of strictly positive
real-valued variables. A monomial over V is an expression
of the form
f = c · xa11 · · ·xann ,
where c ∈ R+ is a positive coefficient, and ai ∈ R are
exponents for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A posynomial over V is a sum of
one or more monomials:
g =
K∑
k=1
ck · xa1k1 · · ·xankn . (1)
If ck is allowed to be a negative real number for any 1 ≤
k ≤ K, then the expression (1) is a signomial.
This definition of monomials differs from the standard al-
gebraic definition where exponents are positive integers with
no restriction on the coefficient sign. A sum of monomials
is then called a polynomial.
B. Nonlinear programs.
A general nonlinear program (NLP) over a set of real-
valued variables V is
minimize f (2)
subject to
gi ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3)
hj = 1, j = 1, . . . ,m, (4)
where f , gi, and hj are arbitrary functions over V , and m
and p are the number of inequality and equality constraints
of the program respectively.
C. Signomial programs and geometric programs.
A special class of NLPs known as signomial programs
(SP) is of the form (2)–(4) where f , gi and hj are signomials
over V , see Def. II-A. A geometric program (GP) is an SP of
the form (2)–(4) where f, gi are posynomial functions and hj
are monomial functions over V . GPs can be transformed into
convex programs [20, §2.5] and then can be solved efficiently
using interior-point methods [26]. SPs are non-convex pro-
grams in general, and therefore there is no efficient algorithm
to compute global optimal solutions for SPs . However, we
can efficiently obtain local optimal solutions for SPs in our
setting, as shown in the following sections.
In this paper, the adversary with bounded rationality moves
in an environment modeled as a Markov decision process
(MDP) [6].
D. Markov Decision Processes.
A (MDP) is a tuple M = (S, ν,A, T, U) where
• S is a finite set of states;
• ν : S → [0, 1] is the initial state distribution;
• A is a finite set of actions;
• T (s, a, s′) := P (s′|s, a). That is, the probability of
transiting from s to s′ with action a; and
• U(s) ∈ R+ is the utility function that assigns resources
with a quantity U(s) to state s.
At each state s, an adversary has a set of actions available
to choose. Then the nondeterminism of the action selection
has to be resolved by a policy pi executed by the adversary.
A (memoryless) policy pi : S × A → [0, 1] of an MDP M
is a function that maps every state action pair (s, a) where
s ∈ S and a ∈ A with probability pi(s, a).
By definition, the policy pi specifies the probability for the
next action a to be taken at the current state s. A bounded ra-
tional adversary is often limited in memory and computation
power, therefore we only consider the memoryless policies.
In an MDP, a finite state-action path is ω = s0a0s1a1...,
where si ∈ S, ai ∈ A and T (si, ai, si+1) > 0. Given a
policy pi, it is possible to calculate the probability of such
path Ppi(ω) as
Ppi(ω) = ν(s0)
∏
i
pi(si, ai)T (si, ai, si+1). (5)
III. REWARD-BASED DECEPTION
We assume that an adversary with bounded rationality
moves around in an environment modeled as an MDP M =
(S, ν,A, T, U). When the adversary is at a state s ∈ S, from
the defender’s point of view, the immediate reward for the
human adversary (or equivalently, the cost for the defender)
is
R(s) = g(U(s)) ∈ R+,
which is a function of allocated resource U(s). However, due
to the bounded rationality and cognitive biases, the perceived
immediate reward Rh(s) at state s by the adversary is a
different function of U(s), and is given by
Rh(s) = f(U(s)) ∈ R+,
where f is another function over U . For a given policy pi,
expected rewards Qt(s) at each state s and time t with a
finite time horizon H can be evaluated as
Qt(s) = R(s) +
∑
a
∑
s′
pi(s, a)T (s, a, s′)Qt+1(s′), (6)
where t = 0..., H − 1, QH(s) = R(s). Therefore, Qt
represents the expect accumulated cost of the defender,
or equivalently, expected rewards for the human adversary
obtained from the policy pi.
The defender’s objective is to optimally assign the re-
sources to each state to minimize his cost (equivalently, the
adversary’s reward) Q, where
Q =
∑
ν(s)Q0(s), (7)
by designing the utility function U , where the resources are
of limited quantity, i.e.,
∑
s U(s) = D. Also imagine that
there are set of sensitive states Ss ⊂ S that the adversaries
should be kept away from. Denote the set of paths that
reach Ss in H steps as Ω such that for each ω ∈ Ω where
ω = s0a0, ..., sN , we require N ≤ H, si /∈ Ss, i < N and
sN ∈ Ss. In particular, given a policy pi, P (♦≤HSs) can be
calculated as
P (♦≤HSs) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω). (8)
Problem 1: Given an MDP M = (S, ν,A, T, U), time
horizon H , human reward function defined in (12) and the
policy pi, design reward function U with a limited total
budget
∑
s U(s) = D, such that Q as defined in (7) can
be minimized sˆ and P (♦≤HSs) ≤ λ, which requires that
the probability to reach Ss in H steps should be no larger
than λ ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
P (♦≤HSs) ≤ λ. (9)
Remark 1: Problem 1 studies how to optimally assign
the reward to trick the adversary into thinking that his
policy could obtain more rewards but in fact, the actual
expected reward is minimized with a low probability of
visiting sensitive states Ss.
A. Human Adversaries with Cognitive Biases
To solve Problem 1, it is essential to find the adversary’s
policy pi. In this paper, we take human as the adversary with
bounded rationality who is opportunistic, meaning that he
does not have a specific attack goal nor plans strategically,
but is flexible about his movement plan and seek opportu-
nities for attacks [27]. Those attacks may incur rewards to
the human adversary and consequently certain costs for the
defender. The process of human decision-making typically
follows several steps [28]. First, a human recognizes his
current situation or state. Second, he will evaluate each
available action based on the potential immediate reward it
can bring. Third, he will select an action following some
rules. Then he will receive a reward and observe a new state.
In this section, we will introduce the modeling framework
for the second and third step.
For a human with bounded rationality, the value of a
reward from an action is a function of the possible outcomes
and their associated probabilities. The prospect theory de-
veloped by Kahneman and Tversky [16] is a frequently used
modeling framework to characterize the reward perceived by
a human. Prospect theory claims that humans tend to over-
estimate the low probabilities and underestimate the high
probabilities in a nonlinear fashion. For example, between
winning 100 dollar with 1100 probability and nothing else, or
1 dollar with probability 1, humans tend to prefer the former,
even though both have the same expectation.
Given X as the discrete random variable that has a
finite set of outcomes O, a general form of prospect theory
utility V (X) (i.e. the reward anticipated by a human) is the
following.
V (X) =
∑
x∈O
v(x)w(p(x)), (10)
where v(x) ∈ R denotes the reward perceived by a human
from the outcome x. The probability p(x) to get the outcome
x is weighted by a nonlinear function w that captures
the human tendency to over-estimate low probabilities and
under-estimate high probabilities.
The expected immediate reward ra(s) to perform an action
a at state s is
ra(s) =
∑
s′
R(s′)T (s, a, s′). (11)
However, according to prospect theory, from a human’s
perspective, the perceived expected immediate reward rha(s)
is different. Let Xs,a be the random variable for the outcome
Os,a of executing action a at state s. We have Os,a =
{x′s|T (s, a, s′) > 0} where xs′ denotes the event that the
state transits from s to s′ with an action a. The distribution
of Xs,a is defined as follows.
p(xs′) = T (s, a, s
′),∀xs′ ∈ Os,a.
The human perceived reward v(xs′) for the outcome xs′
depends on U(s′) received from reaching the state s′, which
is denoted by
v(xs′) = Rh(s
′) = f(U(s′)).
s0s1
s2 s3
s4U(s1) = 5
U(s2) = 2 U(s3) = 2.5
U(s4) = 2.5
a, 0.1
a, 0.9
b, 0.5
b, 0.5
Fig. 1. A simple example for sub-optimality with human cognitive biases
As a result, rha(s) is denoted by
rha(s) =
∑
xs′∈Os,a
v(xs′)w(p(xs′))
=
∑
s′
f(U(s′))w(T (s, a, s′)).
(12)
An empirical form of w is the following [16].
w(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ) 1γ
, γ > 0. (13)
Given an MDP as depicted in Figure 1, where S =
{s0, . . . , s4}, A = {a, b}. We assume that R(s) = U(s),
Rh(s) = U(s)
0.88, γ = 0.6 in (13). It can be found from (11)
and (12) that ra(s0) = 2.3, rha(s0) = 2.0678, rb(s0) = 2.5
and rhb (s0) = 1.8617. Since r
h
a(s0) > r
h
b (s0), suppose a
human is at s0, from human’s perspective, he will prefer
the action a. However, ra(s0) < rb(s0) which indicates that
action a actually has more expected immediate rewards.
Remark 2: In this example, the rewards are already given,
and it can be seen that the human could make a sub-optimal
decision. It illustrates how cognitive bias can deviate the
human behavior from optimal.
After evaluating the outcome of each candidate action a
by rha(s), a human then needs to make an action selection.
Humans are known to only have quite limited cognitive
capabilities. Human’s policy pi to choose an action can be
described as a random process that biases toward the actions
of high rha(s), such that
pi(s, a) =
rha(s)∑
a′ r
h
a′(s)
, (14)
where pi(s, a) denotes the probability of executing the action
a at state s. Such a bounded rational behavior has been
observed in humans, such as urban criminal activities [29].
Intuitively, it implies that human selects the action a oppor-
tunistically at each state s with the probability proportional
to the perceived immediate reward rha(s).
Now we are ready to redefine Problem 1 as follows.
Problem 2: Solve Problem 1 for pi defined as (14).
IV. SIGNOMIAL PROGRAMMING FORMULATION
Given an MDP M, time horizon H , human reward func-
tion and policy as defined in (12) and (14), the solution of
the Problem 1 can be computed by solving the following
signomial program. The g and f are assumed to be monomial
functions of U for our solution method.
minimize Q =
∑
ν(s)Q0(s) (15)
subject to
∀s ∈ S, t ∈ {0, . . . ,H − 1},
Qt(s) ≥ R(s) +
∑
a∈A
∑
s′∈S
pi(s, a)T (s, a, s′)Qt+1(s′)
(16)
∀s ∈ S, t ∈ {0, . . . ,H − 1},
Pt(s) ≥
∑
a∈A
∑
s′∈S
pi(s, a)T (s, a, s′)Pt+1(s′) (17)
∀t ∈ {0, . . . ,H},∀s ∈ Ss, Pt(s) = 1 (18)
∀t ∈ {0, . . . ,H},
∑
s∈S
ν(s)Pt(s) ≤ λ (19)
∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A,
pi(s, a)
∑
a′∈A
∑
s′∈S
f(U(s′))w(T (s, a′, s′))
=
∑
s′∈S
f(U(s′))w(T (s, a, s′)) (20)
∀s ∈ S, R(s) = g(U(s)) (21)∑
s∈S
U(s) = D, (22)
where variables R(s) are for rewards in each state s, U(s)
are for utilities in each state s, pi(s, a) are for the probability
of taking action a in state s are for each state and action,
Qt(s) are for the expected reward of the state s and time
step t, and Pt(s) are for the probability of reaching the set
of target states Ss in each state s and time step t.
The objective in (15) minimizes the accumulated expected
reward from the initial state distribution ν(s) over a time
horizon H . In (16), we compute Qt(s) by adding the
immediate reward in state s and the expected reward of the
successor states according to the policy variables pi(s, a) for
each action a. The probability of reaching each successor
state s′ depends on the policy variables pi(s, a) in each state
s and action a. Similar to the constraint in (16), the variables
Pt(s) are assigned to the probability of reaching the set of
target states Ss from state s and time step t in (17).
The probability of reaching any state s ∈ Ss in each
horizon from the states in Ss is set to 1 as in (18). The
constraint in (19) assures that the probability of reaching
any state s ∈ Ss from the initial state distribution ν(s) is
less than λ. The constraint in (20) computes the policy using
the model in (14). We give the relationship between rewards
and utilities in (21). Finally, (22) gives the total budget for
utilities.
The constraint in (16) and (17) are convex constraints,
because the functions in the right hand sides are posynomial
functions, and the functions in the left hand sides are mono-
mial functions. The constraints in (18) and (19) are affine
constraints, therefore they are convex. The constraints in (20)
and (22) are equality constraints with posynomials, therefore
they belong to the class of signomial constraints, and they
are not convex. In the literature, there are various methods
to deal with the nonconvex constraints to obtain a locally
optimal solution including sequential convex programming,
convex-concave programming, branch and bound or cutting
plane methods [30], [20], [31].
V. COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH FOR THE SIGNOMIAL
PROGRAM
In this section, we discuss how to compute a locally
optimal solution efficiently for Problem 1 by solving the
signomial program in (15)–(22). We propose a sequential
convex programming method to compute a local optimum
of the signomial program in (15)–(22), following [20, §9.1],
solving a sequence of GPs. We obtain each GP by replacing
signomial constraints in equality constraints of the SGP sig-
nomial program in (15)–(22) with monomial approximations
of the functions.
A. Monomial approximation
Given a posynomial f , a set of variables {x1, . . . , xn},
and an initial point xˆ, a monomial approximation [20] fˆ for
f around xˆ is
∀i.1 ≤ i ≤ n fˆ = f [xˆ]
n∏
i=1
(
xi
xˆ(xi)
)ai
,
where ai =
xˆ(xi)
f [xˆ]
∂f
∂xi
[xˆ].
Intuitively, a monomial approximation of a posynomial f
around an initial point xˆ corresponds to an affine approxima-
tion of the posynomial f . Such an approximation is provided
by the first order Taylor approximation of f , see [20, §9.1]
for more details.
For a given instantiation of the utility and policy variables
U(s) and pi(s, a), we approximate the SP in (15)–(22) to
obtain a GP as follows. We first normalize the utility values
to ensure that they sum up to D. Then, using those utility
values, we compute the policy according to constraint in (20).
After the policy comptutation, we compute a monomial
approximation of each posynomial term in the constraints
(20) and (22) around the previous instantiation of the utility
and policy variables. After the approximation, we solve the
approximate GP. We repeat this procedure until the procedure
converges.
One key problem with this approach is, we require an
initial feasible point to the signomial problem in (15)–(22),
which may be hard to find because of the reachability
constraint in (19). Therefore, we introduce a new variable
τ and we replace the reachability constraint in (19) by the
following constraints:
∀t ∈ {0, . . . ,H},
∑
s∈S
ν(s)Pt(s) ≤ λ · τ (23)
τ ≥ 1. (24)
By replacing the reachability constraint, we ensure that
any initial utility function and policy is feasible to the
signomial program in (15)–(24). To enforce the feasability of
the reachability constraint in (19), we change the objective
in (15) as follows:
minimize Q+ δ · τ (25)
where δ is a positive penalty parameter that determines
the violation rate for the soft constraint in (23). In our
formulation, we increase δ after each iteration to satisfy the
reachability constraint.
We stop the iterations when the change in the value of Q
is less than a small positive constant . Intuitively,  defines
the required improvement on the objective value for each
iteration; once there is not enough improvement, the process
terminates.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
Let us consider an urban security problem, where a
criminal plans his next move randomly based on his local
information on the nearby locations that are protected by
police patrols. Such a criminal is opportunistic, i.e, he is
not highly strategic by conducting careful surveillance and
rational planning before making moves. It is known that this
kind of opportunistic adversaries contribute to the majority
of the urban crimes [32]. For prevention and protection, each
location should be assigned a certain police patrol hours. Due
to the limited amount of police resources, the total number
of patrol hours is limited as well.
Fig. 2. The 35 intersections in North East of San Francisco. The map
is obtained from Google map. The shaded area is a circle with a 500
feet radius. The numbering of the states starts from the bottom left corner
and goes from left to right in every row. The number beside each location
indicates the number of crimes in that area.
Figure 2 shows 35 intersections in San Francisco, CA with
7 rows and 5 columns. We use an MDPM = (S, ν,A, T, U)
to describe the network of the set of intersections S. The
number C(s) of crimes that occurred in the first four weeks
of October, 2018 within 500 feet of each interaction s
is shown in Figure 2. The crime data are obtained from
https://www.crimemapping.com/map/ca/sanfrancisco. The
criminal can choose to move left, right, up or down to the
immediate neighboring intersections. Consequently, there
are four actions available. The execution of each action
will lead the human to its intended neighborhood of the
intersection with a high probability (≥ 0.95) and small
probability to other neighboring intersections to account for
unexpected change of movement plan.
Initially, the criminal has equal probability to appear at any
state, i.e., ν(s) = 135 for any s ∈ S. The utility U(s) denotes
the number of police patrol hours that should be allocated to
the vicinity of each intersection. The total number of police
patrol hours is D =
∑
U(s) = 400. If a location s is
assigned with U(s) patrol hours, its reward to the criminal
(equivalently, the cost to the defender) is
R(s) =
C(s)
U(s)
.
Intuitively, it means that the reward to the human adversary,
from the defender’s point of view, is proportional to the
crime rate indicated by C(s) and inversely proportional to the
police patrol hours. The reward from the human adversary’s
view is evaluated as
f(U(s)) = R(s)0.88,
which is a function commonly seen in the literature to
describe how human biases the reward [15].
Initially, the criminal is at s with probability ν(s), where
he tries to plan his move over the next H steps. The objective
is to assign the police patrol hours to each state, such that
the expected accumulated reward in H steps received by the
criminal is minimized. The sensitive states Ss = {3, 14, 33}
should be visited with a probability no larger than λ = 0.3,
i.e.
P (♦≤HSs) ≤ 0.3.
The sensitive states are also shown as blue circles in Figure
2.
We formulate the problem as a signomial program. From
an initial uniform utility distribution, we instantiate the poli-
cies and reward functions. Then, from the initial values, we
linearize the signomial program in (15)–(25) to a geometric
program. We parse the geometric programs using the tool
GPkit [33], and solve them using the solver MOSEK [34].
We set  = 10−4 for convergence tolerance. All experiments
were run on a 2.3 GHz machine with 16 GB RAM. The
procedure converged after 32 iterations for a problem with
horizon length T = 20 in 230.06 seconds. The expected
reward Q from the initial state distribution is 117.15, and the
reachability probability of the sensitive states from the initial
state distribution is 0.192, which satisfies the reachability
specification.
The result is shown in Figure 3. Different colors at each
intersection show the number of patrol hours, i.e, the resource
Fig. 3. The distribution of utility U .
U(s), assigned to each location s. In Figure 3, U(s) is shown
with a logarithmic scale for better illustration. As the color
bar at the bottom of the figure indicates, the closer the color
at each location is to the right side of this bar, the higher
patrol hours are assigned. For example, the state at (3, 1)
(the third state from the first row), where C(s) = 48 gets
assigned patrol hour equals 106 which is approximately 2 in
logarithmic scale. Therefore, its color is yellow in Figure 3
as indicated by the right tip of the color bar. Together with
Figure 2, it can be observed that sensitive places and places
with a higher number of crimes get assigned more patrol
hours. Consequently, the rewards at those states are fairly
low to discourage the criminal from visiting it. The cost at
each location is proportional to the crime rate and inversely
proportional to the police patrol hours. The patrol hours
assigned to each place intends to minimize the expected cost
incurred by the human adversary.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a general framework for deceiving
adversaries with bounded rationality in terms of the obtained
reward minimization. Leveraging the cognitive bias of the
human from well-known prospect theory, we formulate the
reward-based deception as a resource allocation problem
in Markov decision process environment and solve as a
signomial program to minimize the adversary’s expected
reward. We use police patrol hour assignment as the illustra-
tive example and show the validity of our propose solution
approach. It opens doors for further research on the topic to
consider the scenarios where defender can move around and
react to the human adversaries in real time, and the human
adversary has a learning capability to adapt the defender’s
deceiving policy.
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